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Abstract 
 
We analyze the effects, on nonredistributive taxation and on migrations, of wage differentials 
existing between two countries (regions) differing by the size of their population. Residents, 
otherwise identical, are heterogeneous because they incur different migration costs. Each resident 
compares the post-tax amount of money at home with the one obtained abroad, including the cost 
of migration. The government in each country maximizes the tax product in order to provide the 
largest possible amount of public good. We first assume that the income of citizens are identical 
across countries. Then, we assume that wages differ from one country to the other. We prove the 
existence of an equilibrium for any configuration of wage and any different relative size of the 
countries (regions). Then, we compute and characterize the equilibrium for any set of parameters, 
size and wage differential. 
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1 Introduction
In this note, we analyze the e¤ects on taxes and migrations of wage
di¤erentials existing between two countries (regions) di¤ering by the
size of their population. Migrations are populationsmovements from
some countries (jusridictions) to others generated by migrantsfeelings
that life conditions would be better abroad than at home.
The lion s share of the literature on labor mobility and scal com-
petition deals with the e¤ects of redistributive taxation on migrations.
It puts forward the fact that political institutions cannot intervene in
their own juridisdiction as if they were living in isolation from the rest
of the world, as individuals vote "with their feet" for their most preferred
jurisdiction (Tiebout, 1956). In a way, redistributive policies give rise
to a phenomenon of attraction/repulsion dichotomy: those individuals
who benet from redistribution are attracted to jurisdictions involved
in redistribution, while those who are damaged are repelled. So, when
putting in place redistributive policies in their own jurisdiction, politi-
cal institutions are engaged in a sort of scal competition whose main
consequences are not yet completely elucidated. This basic idea was in-
troduced in the literature by Stigler (1957), Oates (1968), and Musgrave
(1969). Then, mainly due to the European economic integration, in the
past decades it got a renewed attention. Indeed, removal political and
economic barriers between countries has determined an increasing mobil-
ity of factors, highly sensitive to di¤erent redistributive policies of gov-
ernments members of the Union. See, for instance, Wildasin (1988, 1991,
2000, 2006), Myers (1990), Epple and Romer (1991),Wellisch (2000),
Hansen and Kessler (2001), Piaser (2003), Puy (2003), Bierbrauer, Brett
and Weymark (2011) among others.
While sharing with the mainstream literature some characteristics -
in particular, the attraction/ repulsion phenomenon - , the present paper
is not directly concerned with the problem of redistribution. Starting
from the fact that nations use taxation not only with a redistributive
purpose, but also in order to nance other interventions of the Govern-
ment, like nancing the production of physical public goods, the activity
of civil servants, the education of children, the defense of the territory,
our analysis centers around the following question: what is the impact of
non-redistributive taxation policies on migration ows between countries
and jurisdictions, di¤ering in size and productive e¢ ciency?
Among the major elements inuencing migration decisions of indi-
viduals, are the public facilities at home compared with those o¤ered
abroad, as well as the di¤erentials in wages existing among countries.
Regions with a rich panoply of public goods exert a strong attraction
on the natives of countries (or regions) not so well endowed with such
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public facilities. For instance, a large fraction of migrations from the de-
veloping countries to those belonging to the European Community could
probably be explained by the presence in the latter of social protection
and other social benets, not available to such an extent in the former.
Similarly, educational advantages of a country over another drain a sig-
nicant fraction of the young citizenspopulation from the latter to the
former. Of course, individuals are also attracted by private richness. The
abundance and variety of private goods in a country is certainly a pow-
erful attractor for citizens belonging to other, less endowed, regions. In
particular, a large wage di¤erential between two regions or two countries
should clearly serve to set in motion migration movements from the lower
to the higher wage region, simply because in market economies larger
wages give access to more and better consumption.
Of course, migration decisions must also take into account the costs
resulting from moving abroad, as well as the di¤erential in taxes to be
paid in each of them. The cost of moving abroad is heterogeneous across
the population of residents. Some of them are strongly linked to their
relatives living in their home country, while others are considerably more
mobile, simply because they are less attached to the people living around
them. National traditions, patriotism, historical origins and meteorolog-
ical conditions constitute other values to be considered, with a varying
inuence across citizens of a given country. Accordingly, individuals
placed otherwise in similar situations appear as heterogeneous in their
willingness to move abroad to nd better conditions in their economic
environment. The di¤erential in taxes is another crucial element inu-
encing the decision to migrate. While a higher wage abroad plays as a
powerful attractor for migrants, a larger tax pressure on the contrary
operates as a strong repellent.
Also, while a lot of contributions is concerned with the problem of
existence of an equilibrium under tax competition and capital mobility
(see, for instance, Laussel and Le Breton 1998, Wildasin 1988, Fuest,
Herbert and Mintz 2005, among others), nothing similar exists, to the
best of our knowledge, for models with non redistributive tax competi-
tion and labor mobility. In the model considered below, we explicitely
identify the unique Nash equilibrium in taxes corresponding to any set of
exogenous parameters, namely, the size of each region and the wage dif-
ferential (generated by di¤erent productive e¢ ciencies) existing between
them.
The above comments evoke the cornerstones of the simple model of
labor mobility and scal competition studied in this note. There are two
countries, home H and foreign F; with country F being assumed smaller
in terms of its population. Citizens can freely move from one country
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to the other. Residents otherwise identical are heterogeneous because
they incur di¤erent migration costs. Each resident compares the post-
tax amount of money obtained at home with the one obtained abroad,
including the cost to be incurred due to migration. The government in
each country maximizes the tax product in order to provide the largest
possible amount of public good. Countries are assumed to play a two
stage game. In the rst stage, each government is assumed to set its
tax, taking into consideration the possible migration ow initiated as a
consequence of its scal pressure. In the second stage, residents in each
country decide whether to stay in their own country or to migrate.
We start by considering the simplest situation where the per capita
income of citizens in both jurisdictions is initially the same for each
citizen and across regions. The main outcome of this section is that,
at the equilibrium of the above-two stage game, only the size di¤erence
explains migration: the migration ow, when it exists, always goes from
the larger country, H; to the smaller one, F . Furthermore the small
country sets a smaller (and nonull) tax than the larger whenever it is
"very small". On the contrary, when its size gets closer to the larger
one, the small country sets its tax equal to zero and keep it at that
level,while the larger one plays its best reply against the zero tax strategy
of the smaller country, and no further migration fromH to F takes place
anymore: this "corner" equilibrium with no migration occurs as long as
the small country remains smaller than country H:
Then, we extend the analysis by considering that the rms inside each
region own a same linear technology, and hire its citizens as workers, who
get a wage equal to their marginal product.We assume that the linear
technology di¤ers across regions, entailing wages also di¤erent from one
country to the other. We start by assuming that the larger region is
more e¢ cient than the small one. In this situation, the citizens living
in the larger region, endowed with the better technology, always obtain
a larger wage than in the small one. For this case, our main results
are as follows. For small di¤erentials in wages, migration takes place
from the larger country H to the smaller country F: This migration is
essentially motivated by the tax di¤erential, the tax in country F being
substantially weaker than in country H: However, in proportion as the
wage di¤erential increases, country F is forced to decrease its tax in order
to keep its attractiveness on the citizens of its rival country. At some
point of this process, its equilibrium tax becomes equal to zero. Then
migration from H to F stops while the di¤erential in wages goes on to
increase. Suddenly, this di¤erential becomes so important that it starts
to become attractive for citizens of the smaller country to ee to country
H: Of course, this reversal in the direction of migration keeps going on
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as long as the di¤erential of wages still increases. Thus, in a nutshell,
migrations can be described as follows. For small di¤erences in wages,
the attractive force exerted by a smaller tax generates a migration ow
from the larger to the smaller country. For a higher di¤erence in wages,
the ow is reverted because the di¤erence in wages exerts an attractive
force operating in the opposite direction.
Then, we consider the reverse case when the smaller country is more
e¢ cient than the larger one. In this situation, the large country ben-
ets from being large while the smaller one enjoys a higher productive
e¢ ciency. Under this alternative assumption, there exists no interior
equilibrium with migration from the smaller country to the larger one,
while the reverse is true in a large domain of wage di¤erentials. Never-
theless, migration from the smaller country can be observed whenever
the larger country sets a zero tax at equilibrium, compensating thereby
the smaller wage existing in it.
In the next section, we present the formal model. In section 3, we an-
alyze tax competition assuming equal income for citizens in both regions.
Section 4 and 5 extend the analysis to regions endowed with di¤erent
linear technologies. Finally, a short conclusion summarizes our ndings
and opens avenues for further research.
2 The basic model
Consider two countries, H and F , which impose taxes on their residents.
The population in each country is uniformly distributed over types and
the set of types is represented in each country by the [0,1] interval. Each
type of resident is endowed with one unit of income. Assume without
loss of generality that the population is larger in country H than in
country F and denote by l0, l0 < 12 ; the population density in country
F , and 1   l0 the population density in H. Accordingly, country F is
smaller than country H:We also assume that the population is ranked
in each unit interval according to the migration cost to be paid when
moving from ones own country to the other, which we assume to be
equal to x for type x; x 2 [0; 1] :Thus, migration cost is the only source
of heterogeneity among the agents. In particular, we assume in the basic
model that each citizen in each country is endowed initially with one unit
of income. We denote by th (resp. tf ) the tax rate in country H (resp.
F ), th; tf 2 [0; 1] : The income tax revenue of the government writes as
(1  l0)th
in country H, and
l0tf
in country F .
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3 A tax game with the same income in each country
We assume that each Government maximizes its income tax revenue,
given the tax chosen by the other Government, taking into account the
future redistribution in the population resulting from the use of these
taxes . This gives rise to a tax game, with countries H and F as players,
taxes th and tf as strategies and
h(th; tf )= (1  l1(l0))th (1)
f (th; tf )= l1(l0)tf
as payo¤s, where l1(l0) denotes the population in country F resulting
from the redistribution between the populations after the use of the tax
strategies th and tf :
It is easy to identify the value of l1(l0) according as migration takes
place from H to F , or the reverse. First, notice that a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for a migration to take place from H to F is that
th > tf : Indeed, all citizens y in countryH belonging to the interval [0; x]
with x = th   tf prefer to move to country F due to the di¤erential in
taxes: staying at home these citizens y; with y  x; pay th while, moving
abroad, they pay tf + y  th; taking into account the migration cost y:
Accordingly, the population of H in the interval [0; th   tf ] migrates
to country F; so that x = th   tf > 0 is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition to guarantee that migration takes place from H to F:Thus,
the population l1(l0) in country F after taxes is given by
l1(l0) = l0 + (th   tf )(1  l0): (2)
A similar reasoning shows that, if migration takes place from F to H;
which necessarly implies tf > th; the population in country F after taxes
is given by
l1(l0) = l0(1  (tf   th)) = l0(1 + (th   tf )): (3)
Thus, it is exclusively the di¤erential in taxes which determines the
direction and size, of migrations. Substituting (2) in system (1), we
obtain
h(th; tf )= (1  (l0 + (th   tf )(1  l0)))th
f (th; tf )= (l0 + (th   tf )(1  l0))tf :
Both these payo¤s functions are concave in the domains fth : th > tfg
and ftf : tf > thg ; respectively.
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Proposition 1 The unique equilibrium of the tax game provides migra-
tion from country H to country F; and is given by
tf =
l0 + 1
3(1  l0) ; t

h =
2  l0
3(1  l0) ; (4)
Furthemore, x(th; t

f ) =
(2l0 1)
3(l0 1) and t

f 7 th () l0 7 12 :
Proof. Consider the tax game between countries H and F . Let (th; t

f )
denote a Nash equilibrium of this game (if it exists) and assume rst
that a migration from H to F takes place at equilibrium. Then th > t

f ,
and all citizens of country H in the interval [0; x] with x = th   tf > 0
prefer to move to country F due to the di¤erential in taxes. Accordingly,
the population l1(l0) in country F after taxes is given by
l1(l0) = l0 + (t

h   tf )(1  l0):
Since payo¤s functions are concave in the domains

th : th > t

f
	
and
ftf : tf > thg ; respectively, rst order conditions must be satised at
equilibrium and are given by
@h(th; tf )
@th
= tf   l0   2th   l0tf + 2l0th + 1 = 0
and
@f (th; tf )
@tf
= l0   2tf + th + 2l0tf   l0th = 0:
Consequently, the candidate equilibrium values are necessarly given by
the solution of the above system, namely,
tf =
l0 + 1
3(1  l0) ; t

h =
2  l0
3(1  l0) ;
which satises the required constraints of positivity, and x(th; t

f ) = t

h 
tf > 0 (we denote by x(t

h; t

f ) the value of x at equilibrium): It is easy
to check that no value th < tf ; or tf < t

h could lead to a higher tax
revenue, either for country H or for country F: Consequently (tf ; t

h) is
a Nash equilibrium.
Now we show uniqueness. Assume that an equilibrium (th; t

f ) would
exist with migration from country F to country H: Then the inequality
tf   th > 0 must necessarly hold. Furthermore, all citizens of country
F in the interval

0; x(th; t

f )

with x(th; t

f ) = t

f   th prefer to move to
country H due to the di¤erential in taxes. Accordingly, the population
l1(l0) in country F after taxes is given by
l1(l0) = l0(1 + th   tf )
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and payo¤s are given by
h(th; tf ) = (1  l0(1 + th   tf ))th
and
f (th; tf ) = (l0(1 + th   tf ))tf :
A similar reasoning as above shows that the rst order conditions
l0tf   l0   2l0th + 1=0
l0   2l0tf + l0th=0
must hold in the subdomain f(th; tf ) : tf   th  0g so that the candi-
date equilibrium values must in particular solve the above linear system,
namely, tf =
1+l0
3l0
and th =
2 l0
3l0
: But these values are not admissible
since x(th; t

f ) = t

f   th < 0; which contradicts our starting assumption
according to which migration takes place from F to H at equilibrium
. Accordingly, there exists no equilibrium to the tax game with mi-
gration from country F to country H: It is easy to check that neither
(th; tf ) = (0; 0); nor (th; tf ) = (0; tf ) or (th; 0) for some strictly positive
values of th or tf ; can be an equilibrium. Thus the equilibrium identied
above is the unique equilibrium of the tax game, which completes the
proof of the proposition.Q.E.D
Thus, at the equilibrium of the above two stage game, migration is
fully explained by the di¤erence in size between the two regions: the
migration ow always goes from the large country, H; to the smaller one,
F . Notice that the equilibrium tax in the small country is smaller than
in the larger one in the whole admissible range for l0(

0; 1
2

): Also, both
countries increase their tax in proportion as their sizes get closer and
closer to each other, but the small country at a rate which is the double
of the larger one. Paradoxically, it seems that this increase in taxes
should be detrimental to both countries since it reinforces the incentives
of natives for each country to ee to the other one. However, at the
same time, this increase in taxes overcompensates the loss incurred in
the national icome due to migrants eeing away outside the country.
Now we examine the problem of migration when countries di¤er not
only by size but also when wages are di¤erent in country H and country
F:
4 Higher wages in country H
In order to make these wages endogenous, we suppose that each individ-
ual in each country is endowed with one unit of labour sold on a labour
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competitive market. In country i; labour demand comes from a contin-
uum of rms with a constant returns to scale production function iz;
i = H;F: Then, competitive wages wh and wf are given by wh = H
and wf = F . In the present section, we shall assume that country H
has a higher productivity than country F; i.e, wh > wf :We examine the
reverse case in section 5.
4.1 Migration from H to F : interior equilibria
Let us rst consider migration from H to F: In order to determine the
last citizen willing to leave from H to F; dene x by the equality
wh   th = wf   tf   x;
or
x = (th   tf )  (wh   wf )
with x > 0; which is a necessary and su¢ cient condition to get a
migration from H to F: Now it appears that the size and direction of
migration not only depends on the di¤erence between taxes, but also on
the di¤erence between the productivities, or equivalently, between the
wages in the two countries.The resulting payo¤s are given by
f (th; tf )= tf (l0 + (1  l0) ((th   tf )  (wh   wf )))
h(th; tf )= th (1  (1  l0) ((th   tf )  (wh   wf ))  l0) :
First order conditions obtain as: @h(th;tf )
@th
= tf   l0   2th   wf + wh  
l0tf + 2l0th + l0wf   l0wh + 1 = 0 and @f (th;tf )@tf == l0   2tf + th +wf  
wh + 2l0tf   l0th   l0wf + l0wh = 0:The candidate equilibrium is given
by the pair of strategies
tf =
(wh   wf   l0 + l0wf   l0wh   1)
3l0   3
th=
(l0 + wf   wh   l0wf + l0wh   2)
3l0   3 :
In order of obtaining a migration from country H to country F; we need
1 > x(th; t

f ) > 0; which holds if, and only if
(wh   wf ) < 2l0   1
l0   1 :
Furthermore it is necessary that th > 0; and t

f > 0: Easy computations
show that both taxes are positive i¤
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tf > 0() (wh   wf ) <
(1 + l0)
1  l0 (5)
th> 0() (wh   wf ) >
l0   2
1  l0 ; (6)
where the last inequality is always satised since l0 < 12 and wh > wf .
Notice also that, (1+l0)
1 l0 >
2l0 1
l0 1 ; so if (wh   wf ) < 2l0 1l0 1 then a fortiori
(wh   wf ) < (1+l0)1 l0 : Thus we can conclude that, when the inequalities
0 < (wh   wf ) < 2l0   1
l0   1 (7)
hold, the pair of strategies (tf ; t

h) is an equilibrium. Thus we state
Proposition 2 When the wage di¤erential wh wf is positive and sat-
ises condition (7), the pair of strategies
tf =
(wh   wf   l0 + l0wf   l0wh   1)
3l0   3
th=
(l0 + wf   wh   l0wf + l0wh   2)
3l0   3
is a Nash equilibrium with migration from H to F: Furthermore, tf < t

h:
4.2 Migration from F to H : interior equilibria
Let us now consider migration from F to H: To this end, in accordance
with the above section, we determine the marginal consumer x in F who
is the last one to be willing to leave F for H; namely
wh   th   x = wf   tf ;
or
x = (wh   wf ) + (tf   th);
with x > 0; which is a necessary and su¢ cient condition to get a
migration from F to H: From this it follows that population in F be-
comes equal to l0 (th   tf + wf   wh + 1) while population in H obtains
as 1  l0 (th   tf + wf   wh + 1) : Accordingly, payo¤s now write as
h(th; tf ) = (1  l0 (th   tf + wf   wh + 1))th
and
f (th; tf ) = l0 (th   tf + wf   wh + 1) tf :
11
First order conditions are given by
@h(th; tf )
@th
= l0tf   l0   2l0th   l0wf + l0wh + 1 = 0
@f (th; tf )
@tf
= l0   2l0tf + l0th + l0wf   l0wh = 0:
Solving the above equations in tf and tf respectively, we get as a candi-
date equilibrium the pair of strategies (tf ; t

h ) dened by
tf =
l0 + l0wf   l0wh + 1
3l0
th =
l0wh   l0wf   l0 + 2
3l0
:
First, let us check under which conditions tf > 0; and t

h > 0; namely,
tf > 0, (wh   wf ) <
(1 + l0)
l0
th > 0, (wh   wf ) >
(l0   2)
l0
; :
where the last inequality is always satised as (wh   wf ) > 0 > (l0 2)l0 .
At this candidate equilibrium; migration would indeed take place from
F to H i¤ x(tf ; t

h ) =
2l0 l0wf+l0wh 1
3l0
2 [0; 1] or (wh   wf ) > (1 2l0)l0 :
Accordingly, we conclude that (tf ; t

h ) (with migration from F to H) is
an equilibrium whenever
(1  2l0)
l0
< (wh   wf ) < (1 + l0)
l0
: (8)
Proposition 3 When the wage di¤erential wh wf is positive and sat-
ises condition (8), the pair of strategies
tf =
1
3l0
(l0 + l0wf   l0wh + 1)
th =
1
3l0
(l0wh   l0wf   l0 + 2)
is a Nash equilibrium with migration from F to H: Furthermore, th >
tf :
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Finally, we prove that, in the intervals
h
0; 2l0 1
l0 1
i
and
h
1 2l0
l0
; 1+l0
l0
i
;
two equilibria cannot exist simultaneously. Another way to formulate
the same question is whether there exist values of l0( 12), and wage
di¤erentials wh   wf satisfying simultaneously the two conditions: (i)
migration from H to F :
0 < (wh   wf ) < 2l0   1
l0   1
and (ii) migration from F to H :
(1  2l0)
l0
< (wh   wf ) < (1 + l0)
l0
?
Denoting by A = 2l0 1
l0 1 ; B =
(1 2l0)
l0
and C = (1+l0)
l0
; the two above
conditions rewrite as
0<wh   wf < A;
B <wh   wf < C:
The following inequalities are easily checked: B > A;C > A;C > B:
So, we immediately derive from the above that the intervals [0; A] and
[B;C] are disjoint: So, whenever 0 < (wh   wf ) < A, the equilibrium is
(th; t

f ) with migration taking place from country H to country F ; while
for any (wh   wf ) satisfying B < (wh   wf ) < C; the equilibrium is
(th ; t

f ) with a migration ow from country F to country H:
4.3 Corner equilibria
Now we analyse whether in the "hole" between A and B; there exists
an equilibrium (t+h ; t
+
f ) with migration taking place from H to F:To
this end, we notice that the best reply, say tf (th); of country F when
migration takes place fromH to F is given by t+f = 0 when wh wf = A:
Accordingly, using the rst order condition @h(th;tf )
@th
= tf   l0   2th  
wf +wh  l0tf +2l0th+ l0wf   l0wh+1 = 0 and computing the value t+h
of the corresponding best reply function th(tf ) of country H to country
F against t+f = 0; we obtain
t+h =
(1 + wh   wf )
2
;
with t+h > 0:It immediately follows that the pair of strategies (t
+
h ; t
+
f ) = (
(1+wh wf )
2
; 0) is a candidate equilibrium in the range [A;B] : To complete
the proof that it is indeed an equilibrium, we have still to show that there
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exists no strictly positive value for tf which could improve the payo¤ of
country F; for any value of wh wf in the range [A;B] : To this end, rst
notice that tf (th); found in the scenario when migration takes place from
H to F; is decreasing with the value of the wage di¤erential (wh   wf ):
Since, at (wh   wf ) = A; tf (th) = t+f = 0, it follows that for any
(wh wf ) such that A < (wh wf ) < B, the best reply tf (th) would be
strictly negative. Accordingly, there exists no strictly positive value for
tf which could improve the payo¤of country F: This completes the proof
that the pair (t+h ; t
+
f ) = (
(1+wh wf )
2
; 0) is, indeed, a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, notice that, at this Nash equilibrium; x(t+h ; t
+
f ) is strictly positive
whenever 1 > wh   wf (res. negative whenever 1 < wh   wf) so that
migration (res. no migration) from H to F takes place. 1 Thus we can
state:
Proposition 4 When the wage di¤erential 2l0 1
l0 1 < wh wf < min(1;
(1 2l0)
l0
);
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, with migration taking place from
H to F; which is given by
(t+h ; t
+
f ) = (
(1 + wh   wf )
2
; 0):
In summary, with higher wages in country H than country F; three
scenarios can arise depending on the size of the di¤erential in wages be-
tween the two countries. When the wage di¤erential is small (smaller
than A), migration takes place at equilibrium from countryH to country
F: This property seems counterintuitive at rst sight, to the extent that
the wage is higher in country H than in country F: However; the tax is
larger in the latter than in the former, and the small wage di¤erential in
favour of countryH is not attractive enough to compensate the repulsion
e¤ect generated by the higher tax in the larger country. The second sce-
nario arises when the wage di¤erential becomes more signicant. Then
the small country quotes a zero tax and, in spite of this, it can be still
unable to attract more migrants from the larger country. Since the wage
di¤erential has become more favourable in country H; even a zero tax
in country F cannot be attractive enough to release migration from the
larger jurisdiction. Finally, when the wage di¤erential is really impor-
tant, the migration ow is reversed: citizens from the smaller jurisdiction
are now attracted by the larger one due to a signicant wage di¤erential
between the two countries.
1It is easy to verify that x(t+h ; t
+
f ) < 1 always holds.
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5 Higher wages in country F
5.1 Migration from H to F : interior equilibria
Let us rst consider migration from H to F: In order to determine the
marginal consumer in H who is the last willing to leave from H to F;
dene x by
wh   th = wf   tf   x;
or
x = (wf   wh)  (tf   th)
with x > 0; which is a necessary and su¢ cient condition to get a
migration from H to F: Now the size and direction of migration not
only depends on the di¤erence between taxes, but also on the di¤erence
between the productivities, or equivalently, between the wages in the
two countries. The resulting payo¤s are given by
f (th; tf )= tf (l0 + (1  l0) ((wf   wh)  (tf   th)))
h(th; tf )= th (1  (1  l0) ((wf   wh)  (tf   th))  l0) :
First order conditions are given by @h(th;tf )
@th
= tf   l0  2th wf +wh 
l0tf + 2l0th + l0wf   l0wh + 1 = 0 and @f (th;tf )@tf == l0   2tf + th +wf  
wh + 2l0tf   l0th   l0wf + l0wh = 0:The candidate equilibrium is given
by the pair of strategies
tf =
(wh   wf   l0 + l0wf   l0wh   1)
3l0   3
th=
(l0 + wf   wh   l0wf + l0wh   2)
3l0   3 :
In order of obtaining a migration from country H to country F; we need
1 > x(th; t

f ) > 0; which holds if, and only if 1 > (wf wh) (tf th) > 0
or
2  l0
1  l0 > wf   wh >
1  2l0
l0   1
where wf  wh > 1 2l0l0 1 is always satised as wf  wh > 0 by assumption
and 1 2l0
l0 1 < 0 as l0 <
1
2
: Furthermore it is necessary that th > 0; and
tf > 0: Easy computations show that both taxes are positive i¤
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tf > 0() (wf   wh) >
(1 + l0)
l0   1
th> 0() (wf   wh) <
(l0   2)
l0   1 ;
where the rst inequality is always satised since l0 < 12 and wf > wh.
Thus we can conclude that, when the inequality
0 < (wf   wh) < 2  l0
1  l0 (9)
holds, the pair of strategies (tf ; t

h) is an equilibrium with migration from
H to F . Thus we state
Proposition 5 When the wage di¤erential wf   wh satises condition
(9), the pair of strategies
tf =
(wh   wf   l0 + l0wf   l0wh   1)
3l0   3
th=
(l0 + wf   wh   l0wf + l0wh   2)
3l0   3
is the unique Nash equilibrium with migration from H to F:
5.2 Migration from F to H
Let us now consider migration from F to H: To this end, we determine
the marginal consumer x in F who is the last one to be willing to leave
F for H; namely
wh   th   x = wf   tf ;
or
x = (wh   wf ) + (tf   th);
with x > 0; which is a necessary and su¢ cient condition to get a
migration from F to H: From this it follows that population in F be-
comes equal to l0 (th   tf + wf   wh + 1) while population in H obtains
as 1  l0 (th   tf + wf   wh + 1) :Accordingly, payo¤s now write as
h(th; tf ) = (1  l0 (th   tf + wf   wh + 1))th
and
f (th; tf ) = l0 (th   tf + wf   wh + 1) tf :
First order conditions are given by
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@h(th; tf )
@th
= l0tf   l0   2l0th   l0wf + l0wh + 1 = 0
@f (th; tf )
@tf
= l0   2l0tf + l0th + l0wf   l0wh = 0:
Solving the above equations in tf and tf respectively, we get as a
candidate equilibrium the pair of strategies (tf ; t

h ) dened by
tf =
1
3l0
(l0 + l0wf   l0wh + 1)
th =
1
3l0
(l0wh   l0wf   l0 + 2)
where tf > 0 i¤wf  wh >  1 l0l0 ; and th > 0 i¤wf  wh < 2 l0l0 : Notice
however that x(tf ; t

h ) < 0: Consequently,
Proposition 6 There exists no interior equilibrium with a positive ow
of migrants from F to H when wf > wh:
5.3 Corner equilibria
So, it remains to check whether there exists an equilibrium with a posi-
tive ow of migrants from F to H when in this latter country, the scal
burden is equal to zero (corner equilibrium). To this end, we assume that
t++h = 0 and examine the value of the best reply function of F against
the strategy 0; namely tf (t++h = 0): Accordingly, using the rst order
condition @f (th;tf )
@tf
= l0   2l0tf + l0th + l0wf   l0wh = 0 and computing
the value t++f (t
++
h = 0); we get
t++f =
(1  wh + wf )
2
;
with t++f > 0: Notice also that 1 > x(t
++
f ; t
++
h ) > 0 i¤ 1 > wf   wh: It
immediately follows that the pair of strategies
(t++h ; t
++
f ) = (0;
(1  wh + wf )
2
is a candidate equilibrium: To complete the proof that it is indeed an
equilibrium, we have still to show that t++h = 0 is a best reply for country
H against t++f : Evaluating t
++
h (t
++
f =
(1 wh+wf )
2
); we obtain that the
strategy 0 is, indeed, the best reply against t++f =
(1 wh+wf )
2
: Accord-
ingly, whenever 1 > wf   wh (res. 1 < wf   wh) the pair of strategies
(t++h ; t
++
f ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game with (res. without) a posi-
tive ow of migrants from F to H.
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Proposition 7 For any wage di¤erential 1 > wf  wh > 0; there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium, with migration from country F to country H;
given by the pair of strategies
(t+h ; t
+
f ) = (0;
(1  wh + wf )
2
):
When, on the contrary, wf   wh  1; (t+h ; t+f ) is a Nash equilibrium
without migration in neither direction.
The two above propositions are perfectly in line with intuition. No
equilibrium from the small to the large country exists with a migration
ow from the smaller country to the larger one: now the wage is higher in
the smaller country. Of course, even the larger country can manipulate
its tax in order to make it as attractive as possible, i.e. by setting its
tax equal to zero, generating thereby a corner equilibrium possibly with
a positive migration from the smaller country to the larger one, in spite
of the smaller wage paid in the latter.
6 Conclusion
Given the relative sizes of the jurisdictions, the direction and the size of
labor mobility in our model depends on two interrelated and opposite
forces: the di¤erential in wages and the di¤erential in taxes. While the
di¤erential in wages is fully determined by the technological superiority
of a country over the other, the di¤erence between taxes is determined
endogenously at equilibrium, and depends both on the di¤erential in
wages and on the di¤erent size of the two jurisdictions. As described in
the introduction, and conrmed formally in section 4, when technologi-
cal e¢ ciency is larger in country H than in country F , migration takes
place, for small di¤erentials in wages, from the larger to the smaller
country: This migration is essentially motivated by the tax di¤erential,
the tax pressure in country F being substantially weaker than in coun-
try H: However, when the wage di¤erential increases due to increasing
di¤erence in productive e¢ ciency, country F has to decrease its tax in
order to remain attractive for the citizens of the rival country. At some
point of this process, its equilibrium tax becomes equal to zero. Then
migration from H to F stops while the di¤erential in wages goes on to
increase. Beyond some value of this di¤erential, it starts to be so im-
portant that it becomes attractive for citizens of the smaller country to
ee to country H: Of course, this reversal in the direction of migration
keeps going on as long as the di¤erential of wages still increases. Thus,
equilibrium migrations evolve as follows. For small di¤erences in wages,
the attractive force exerted by a smaller tax generates a migration ow
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from the larger to the smaller country. For a higher di¤erence in wages
the ow is reverted because the di¤erence in wages exerts an attractive
force operating in the opposite direction. In the middle, for intermediate
values of the wage di¤erential, the solution takes the form of a corner
equilibrium, in which the small country sets a null tax while no migration
takes place in either direction. As described in section 5, when techno-
logical e¢ ciency is higher in the smaller country than in the other, no
migration ow can be observed from the smaller country to the larger
one, except when the latter sets a zero tax in order to compensate the
lower wage at home.
Probably our model could be improved in order to analyze more tra-
ditional questions raised by the mobility of the labor force, resulting
in particular from redistributive policies. This new formulation should
consider the impact of taxes on a population whose members, contrary
to the present approach, would di¤er by their initial income or by their
productivity. Another natural extension of the present research consist
in examining how migrations take place as a function of the relative size
of the two countries, for a xed wage di¤erential of wages between the
two countries. This would consist in replicating the analysis contained
in section 3, where the di¤erential of wages (income) is assumed to be
equal to zero, but where the relative size of the small country is varying
between 0 and 1. The extension would consider any value for the di¤er-
ential of wages. We did not do it ourselves because we found it would be
a simple exercise for the interested reader.
Also a very restricted set of theoretical questions raised by migrations
has been considered in this note. In particular, the European countries
seem today by far more concerned with repelling migrants than attract-
ing them. The main reason for this inversion of motivation seems to be
related to the disastrous economic situation that we presently meet in
Europe, generating in particular an important unemployment in western
countries. In such periods of the business cycle, governments generally
prefer to protect their labour markets frommigrantsinvasion. Of course,
in more favourable periods, the reverse is true and migrants are much
better welcome! It would be fascinating to analyze how rival countries
solve the problem of mutual rejection of migrants unable to be accepted
anywhere. But this is a completely di¤erent story than the one raised in
this paper and which could be an interesting topic for further research.
Nevertheless we feel that our endeavor is fully justied by the clear and
simple results obtained using the present formulation.
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